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The Sizzle or the Steak? How Individuals Process Political Cues
Abstract
The majority of the American electorate is uninformed with regards to politics, and to compensate for
their lack of knowledge, they take political cues from perceived experts. This study examines the impact
of political cues from various sources, and considers how individuals analyze source credibility and
framing. The study was conducted on Illinois Wesleyan University’s campus, via survey collection. Post
data analysis, the surveys proved cues given by perceived experts were more compelling than nonperceived experts, and emotional cues were more compelling than rational cues. These findings confirm
individuals use peripheral route processing more frequently than central route processing , in accordance
with the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo 1980). The multi-regression model also confirms
that individuals with lower levels of political knowledge accept cues at higher frequencies.
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The Sizzle or the Steak?
How Individuals Process Political Cues
Benjamin Nielsen
 bstract
A
The majority of the American electorate is
uninformed with regards to politics, and to
compensate for their lack of knowledge, they
take political cues from perceived experts. This
study examines the impact of political cues
from various sources, and considers how
individuals analyze source credibility and
framing. The study was conducted on Illinois
Wesleyan University’s campus, via survey
collection. Post data analysis, the surveys
proved cues given by perceived experts were
more compelling than non-perceived experts,
and emotional cues were more compelling than
rational cues. These findings confirm
individuals use peripheral route processing
more frequently than central route processing,
in accordance with the elaboration likelihood
model (Petty & Cacioppo 1980). The
multi-regression model also confirms that
individuals with lower levels of political
knowledge accept cues at higher frequencies.
KEY WORDS: political cues; framing effects;
emotional cues; rational cues

On November 6, 2018 approximately 110
million politically motivated Americans turned
out and participated in the midterm elections.
This was the highest turnout in 50 years and 27
million more voters than in the 2014 midterm
elections. This new political vigor is the result
of hyper-polarization, successful get out to vote
campaigns, and the assistance of our rather
eccentric commander-in-chief. Whether you
agree with Trump’s policies, rhetoric, or
general disposition as the president, he has
certainly enticed many people to participate in
the democratic system. However, this new
influx of voters are so entrenched in their jobs
and families, that many of them do not have
time to be well read on every aspect of political
discussion. Voters compensate by taking
information shortcuts and relying on cues they
have gotten from a wide variety of sources.
This process called a heuristic (information
shortcut) is employed when we watch
television, scroll the internet, and learn through
interactions with others. This process is
especially prominent in the political sphere,
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because many voters cannot rationalize every
complex political argument. It is a lot to ask
someone to be fluent in the language of
taxation, foreign policy, healthcare,
environmental regulations, and agriculture..
There are 16 standing committees in the
Senate, 20 standing committees in the House,
and even these experienced politicians refer to
technocrats to assist them in the decision
making process.
This research does not speak to the existence
of cue taking in the American political culture.
These findings are numerous, with particular
emphasis on the association between cue taking
and the media (Carter 2013; Boomgaarden and
Semetko 2011; Iyengar 1990). Instead of
simply identifying the existence of cue taking,
this study is interested in what contextual
factors impact the cue taking process. What
exactly limits or intensifies the probability that
the cue will stick to a malleable individual? In
addition, what kinds of individuals are more
susceptible to cue taking?

that citizens vote in the moment and use
memory-based processes to arrive at their
political conclusions. As far as voting in the
moment, the models assume that voters gauge
their preferences with their current standard of
living. Memory-based processes implies that
voters use their prior political knowledge to
measure candidates against one another. This
indicates that individuals are politically
informed, and have at least a decent
understanding of political actors and salient
issues. This assumption bodes curiosity,
because it is well established that the American
public is woefully uninformed regarding
political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter
1994). However despite the lack of
information, Americans express opinions on a
wide range of issues. This begs the question,
where are these voters getting their political
attitudes from, if we know they aren’t engaging
in frequent political learning (Converse 1960;
Downs 1957)? This leads experts to believe
that Americans frequently participate in
political cue taking.
1. Literature Review
This study of cue taking speaks directly to
A large portion of the existing literature
the research of Richard Petty and John
regarding political attitudes is dedicated to
Cacioppo (1980), in which they conclude there
accurately predicting how an individual will
are 2 strategies that individuals use to take cues
vote, and these algorithms and spatial models
from elites. The utilized methods are central
that predict a voter’s preferences are referred to route processing and peripheral route
as voter I.D models. There are numerous voter processing. (Petty & Cacioppo 1980). “The
I.D models that can predict with relatively high central route to persuasion entails consideration
accuracy how people will likely vote (Shapiro of substantive content, including evidence and
1992; Kelley & Mirer 1973; Markus &
the soundness of an argument’s logic. The
Converse 1979). All of these models are
primary determinant of persuasion through
predicated on two assumptions regarding the
central processing is argument strength”(Gilens
voting method of an individual. They theorize & Murakawa 2002, pg. 15). This cue taking
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requires relatively high degrees of political
knowledge, and an equally high standard of
interest in salient issues. Given that the
majority of the public cannot sustain adequate
interest toward elites for the content of their
cues, they partake in another heuristic that is
less time consuming, but potentially less
accurate. “ The peripheral route, in contrast,
emphasizes consideration of factors external to
message content, such as the credibility and
attractiveness of the message source. The
primary determinants of peripheral-route
persuasion are “persuasion cues” which
produce attitude change “without any active
thinking about the attributes of the issue or the
object under consideration”(Gilens &
Murakawa 2002, pg. 16).
With the foundation of central route versus
peripheral processing being established, it
remains unknown which technique is employed
most frequently. It would be incorrect to
assume that an individual will only look at
substantive evidence, while another only looks
at the character of the cue giver. The
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) is a key
determinant in how an individual will interpret
the cue, and furthermore continue to act on the
advice the elite is giving. “The ELM states that
the amount and nature of the thinking that a
person does about a persuasive message is a
very important determinant of the kind of
persuasion that occurs”(Petty & Cacioppo
1981). Central route theory must result in
elaboration, where the subject uses this new
evidence and tests it against existing evidence
in their schema to draw conclusions. With
merit being the driving factor for an individual

analyzing the cue, valence is the key ingredient
for how the individual will interpret the
message. Conclusions regarding central route
processing include “(a) The cue will be
relatively easy to be called to mind
(accessible), (b) relatively persistent and stable
over time, (c) relatively resistant to challenge
from competing messages, and (d) relatively
predictive of the person’s attitude-relevant
judgements and behavior” (Petty & Cacioppo
1981, pg 34).
In contrast to central route processing,
peripheral route processing relies on the
source’s attractiveness and message length.
Instinctively one can assume that individuals
tasked with interpreting convoluted issues of
tax reform, health care etc. use peripheral cues
generally, because previous knowledge is
required. But a candidate providing this cue
could appear to have a “sincere demeanor and
good values” if they are standing in front of an
American flag, or visiting veterans. Peripheral
route cues will be less accessible, persistent,
resistant, and predictive of behavior, than by
individuals using central route processing. Both
central route and peripheral route processing
are utilized by voters to access cues from their
perceived experts, but there has been no
elaboration about which is employed more
frequently among individuals. I do hypothesize
that there will be a positive relationship
between an individual’s likelihood to accept a
cue, when they associate a higher levels of
perceived expertise from the source, and higher
levels of emotional appeal.
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2. Research Design & Data Analysis
There is an assumption among academics
that individuals are only taking cues from
political elites, where nothing could be further
from the truth. Individuals, whether they mean
to or not, acquire political cues from a
multitude of mediums. Neighbors, social
media, TV ads etc. are just some of the political
messages that individuals sort through. this
provokes a question regarding what political
cues are sticking to malleable individuals when
others do not, if people aren’t focusing on
what is being said, but on who is saying it, and
how its being said? Analyzing political opinion
has been done a variety of ways. Gallup, Pew,
and the Brookings Institute all have various
methods to gauge an individual’s political
knowledge and opinions from issues and
candidates alike. But for the importance of this
study it is important to focus on a few variables
that determine how likely the cue is to “stick.”
To look at this, the subjects will be given
surveys with a variety of political arguments on
them from a source. Anybody from a university
professor to your neighbor will be providing
the cue to the subject. They will “think
carefully about them” and indicate whether
they think the cue is agreeable or not. Subjects
are then asked to respond to this cue by
indicating whether or not they believe this
argument to be compelling, and actually shift
their view. This dichotomy of agreeableness
and compellingness is important, as there are
many arguments that individuals agree with,
but ultimately the cue is unsuccessful if they do
not use that information to shape their beliefs.

“fast and frugal heuristic is
‘one-reason decision making,’ a method
of decision making that uses only one
piece of information. The most
frequently used variant is called ‘take
the best,’ a decision technique where
the single piece of information that is
judged best is used alone for decision
making. This decision criterion is
compared with others. Many of the
comparisons are made using real world
data that were originally used in
statistics textbooks to illustrate
regression techniques. These simple
techniques can obtain results as good
as, or better than, those obtained from
more sophisticated statistical
techniques, such as regression analysis
or Bayesian mechanisms” (Rubin
2018).

 he two variables that will influence the
T
subject (according to Peripheral Route
Processing) is the strength of expertise a
subject believes the cue giver to possess, and
the focus of either logic or emotion in the
context of the argument. Instinctively the first
independent variable looks at how much of an
“expert” a cue giver is, before even analyzing
the argument at all. Looking at the source’s
occupation acts as a “pre-test” for the subject,
and it would be reasonable to assume that if the
subject doesn’t have certain qualifications then
they are immediately dismissed by the subject.
Looking next at how the argument is framed
poses some slight methodological problems.
“Facts v. Emotion” exists on a continuum
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(Pach & Koch 1983), and there is a natural
blend of the two in any effective argument. But
by viewing the two frames as a dichotomy, it
creates a cross table for the questions asked,
and it has 4 quadrants. “Experts” that rely
heavily on rational appeal, which includes
arguments about statistics and logistical claims.
“Experts” who use emotional appeal, and
utilize mainly anecdotes in their arguments.
“Non-experts that use logistical appeal, and
“non-experts” that use emotional appeal. .
These paradigms have become caricatures in
the survey, and analyzing how subjects respond
to each of them will assist in identifying critical
variables for the likelihood a cue will stick.The
main analysis will be the difference of means
test between the initial question of
agreeableness from the source, and the question
of compellingness regarding the sources
argument. If there is a significant difference
between both questions, we can conclude that a
certain source was perceived as more credible.
To analyze the characteristics of malleable
individuals, performing a multiple regression
will illustrate how much explained variance we
can identify in the subjects.
Representing the expert, who uses logistical
emphasis in their argument, we have Illinois
Farm Bureau Director Valerie. Her cue on the
survey is, “Since its inception in 1990, the
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) allowed for an economic boom in
the agriculture industry. In 2016 alone,
Midwest states including Illinois and Iowa have
exports that exceed 1 billion dollars in soy,
corn, and cattle. The disintegration of NAFTA
would cause a collapse of the Midwest farmer.”

She operates within the realm of agriculture in
the Midwest, and also employs statistics that
show her expertise, on the issue of NAFTA.
This relationship between expertise, and logic
represents a large portion of technocratic
influence in congressional committees,
bureaucrats, and party leadership.
Perceived political experts are not only
obligated to using logic when framing their
argument, but many of them employ emotional
appeal when framing arguments involving the
environment, immigration, and gun violence
(Walton) Representing this section of the
crosstab is Professor of Mexican history Jude
Barta. For example, Jude’s cue involves
immigration, a highly debated topic in the
political sphere. “Illegal immigrants are not
only taking jobs away from Americans in
various markets, but are commiting crimes at
significantly higher rates than U.S citizens. We
need to secure our borders, and deport
individuals that did not come to this country
legally.” There is perceived expertise by the
subject, simply because they’ve earned the title
of a professor which shows merit based
successes in the field of academia. In addition,
the subject could perceive additional expertise
about immigration, by associating a
relationship with “Mexican history,” and a
majority of the immigration debate is about
illegal immigrants from Mexico. This argument
shows no sign of statistical evidence, and
doesn’t reference data in any way. However,
there is strong emotional appeal, by equating
the loss of American jobs and increased crime
rate, to the presence of illegal immigrants.
Individuals do not simply take political cues
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from “experts,” but they take them from
individuals in their day to day lives. Some
could argue the process of political
socialization takes place almost exclusively
without “expertise” influencing your decisions.
Parents, neighbors, schools, and celebrities all
provide cues to individuals, whether or not they
truly have expertise on any subjects. An
example of a “non-expert” that uses logistical
appeal in the survey is Moses Montefiore
Rabbi Colleen Marza. Her cue given in the
survey is, “The Congressional Budget Office
estimates the federal budget deficit was $782
billion in fiscal year 2018, and it was $116
billion more than the shortfall recorded in fiscal
year 2017. This is why we need reduce military
spending which increased 36 billion dollars in
2018.” As a clergywoman, there is no
indication given to the subject that she is
experienced in the realm of fiscal policy, but
she evaluates Congressional budget office
statistics. Many of the statistics, and census
data is available to anyone, however
individuals (according to PRT) would not
perceive her as an expert without an additional
degree, or career associated with economics,
because it doesn’t demonstrate a passion, or
interest in the domain.
The last individuals that can provide us with
cues, is the perceived “non-expert” that uses
emotional appeal. Seemingly the weakest
argument, we are surrounded by neighbors and
relatives that provide anecdotal evidence with
little to no source credibility. However, through
socialization these play the greatest role in an
individual’s path to political identity formation
(Blum-Kulka) Representing this group is my

neighbor Thomas Mackie. The cue he provides
in the survey is, “Climate change is this current
generation’s greatest threat. If our current rate
of carbon emission continue, we will live in a
world consumed by natural disasters. We need
to increase federal spending into clean energy,
and increase restrictions on fossil fuel
production.” This cue provides us with no
sources, data, or actual evidence regarding our
“current carbon emissions.” His hyperbole
regarding the imminent danger we are all in
sets the tone for the subject to feel scared, and
accept this cue, so that their posterity will
survive. These 4 paradigms represent who
individuals get information from, but there’s
more to the equation than simply who is giving
the cue.
To avoid any confirmation bias among
politically active individuals, I decided not to
attach partisanship to any of the cue givers, as
research has shown a strong linkage to
confirmation bias among individuals who seek
cues (Zaller 1992, Gigerenzer 1992). But there
needs to be an established level of political
knowledge among the subjects, as high levels
of political knowledge can result in high levels
of confirmation bias (Popkin 1994). To
measure political knowledge the subjects were
given 5 questions from What Americans Know
About Politics and Why It Matters (Delli
Carpini & Keeter 1996).
What are the first 10 amendments of the
Constitution called?
What is the name of the current Vice
President?
Under the Constitution who nominates Federal
judges?
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“yes” was coded as 1.00, and a “no” was coded
as 0.00. In order to provide a reliable and valid
score of the true attitudes regarding political
cues, the inclusion of the option “I don’t know”
was necessary. Coding the “I don’t know”
These authors found a high level of
answers as missing cases provided a true value
correlation between accuracy on these
for the attitudes towards both the “agreeable”
questions, and more general political
and “compelling” questions. The pro-NAFTA
knowledge. By determining a subjects interest cue given by the Farm Bureau caricature had
in politics, we can also determine whether they the most missing cases (51), and this is likely
would be more malleable than others. This will due to lack of political knowledge associated
be tested by asking questions about how much with agriculture. The knowledge questions
news they consume on average per week. We
were gauged on a scale of 1-4 for accuracy.
have given liberty to the subject to define
The question “Which party currently controls
“news” which can range from social media, to the House of Representatives” was omitted
political ads, or cable television. There was
from the study, because the survey was
considerable variation to the issue of the
administered shortly after the midterm
political arguments that are being analyzed by elections. The Democratic party had just won
the subject. This is to allow for a diversity of
back the house from the Republicans, the
emotional and logistical appeals, and also to
timing and wording of this question resulted in
possibly shed some light on the political
many many answers, and would have created
malleability certain individuals have as it
noise in the individual knowledge scores.
pertains to certain subjects. The raw data was
When subjects identified their political party,
collected over a period of approximately 3
there was a sliding scale of 1-5, which
weeks, and there were 201 surveys that
Democrats being coded as 1.00, Independents
comprised the N, in the study. These surveys
as 3.00, and Republicans as 5.00. Regardless of
were conducted by myself in classes with
their answer for this question, the subjects had
expressed permission from professors, and in
to indicate what political preferences they
Ames library from willing participants.
“usually” align with. This sliding scale
3. Results
included 2 additional options into the above
The coding process for the surveys was
measure with “slightly democratic” coded as
consistent for both the “agreeableness”
2.0, and “slightly republican” as 4.0. This
question and the “compellingness” question.
question is meant to tease out individuals who
“Agreeableness” was the question asking the
identify themselves as independents. Gallup
subject, “Do you agree with the statement?”
reports that about ⅓ of the American electorate
and “compellingness” is the question that asked consists of independent voters, however given
the subject “Is this argument compelling?” A
our two-party system, we thought it was
What political party currently controls the U.S
House of Representatives?
What is the current unemployment rate in the
United States?
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necessary to keep individuals honest in their
political preferences. Age was coded as the
number they provided, and the median age of
the study was 20. The final question that was
coded, referred to the subject’s perceived
interest in politics, by asking about how much
news they consume in a weekly basis. “0-1
hours” was a 1.00, “2-3 hours” was a 3.00, “4-5
hours” was a 5.00, “6-7 hours” was a 7.00, and
“more than 7 hours” was coded as an 8.00.
Before any real conclusions could be drawn
from the surveys, I initially had to determine if
the cues my caricatures provided were fair and
balanced. The study doesn’t hold much weight
if every cue was undeniable, or if every cue
contained a weak argument. Because of this,

the caricatures vary depending on their
hypothetical ideological arguments. There were
5 “liberal” arguments and 5 “conservative”
arguments. This variance was supposed to
represent a fair, and balanced panel of political
sources. The Chart 1 shows the distribution of
“agreeableness” among survey respondents,
and what can be seen is a relatively normally
distributed graph. A “truly” fair set of questions
would result in a mean of .5, concluding that
about half of my statements were agreeable,
and half were not. The mean was .56, which
indicates a level of neutrality, and might
suggest that individuals slightly more often
than not agreed with the cue provided to them.

Chart 1: Mean= .56; SD= .152; N=201

Ghart 2: Mean=.64; SD= .224; N=201
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The Chart 2 speaks to the “agreeableness,”
however there was less consistency when we
analyzed the distribution of “compellingness”
answers from the surveys. The graphs mean
distribution of .64, implies there was no
overwhelming bias in the framing of the cues,
and it highlights a subject was more likely to
accept the cue than reject it.
After determining the cues were fair, and can
accurately be analyzed, next was looking at
what sources gave the most effective cues in
the survey. The data measured indicates that
the there was no significant difference in the
level between “agreeableness” for sources with
perceived expertise, and sources with no
perceived expertise. With a mean of .56 for
“agreeableness” and .55 for “compellingness,
this again indicates a level of fairness and
confirms that arguments were agreeable,
regardless of the perceived expertise from the
source. However, there is significant difference
when we compare the mean “compellingness”
scores against perceived experts, and
non-experts. See Table 1.
The overall mean “compellingness” score
with perceived experts was .68, while
non-experts mean score was .59. This
difference seems slight, but given the smaller
question size, this difference indicates the
subjects trusted the perceived expert’s cue in
about 1 more question than the non- expert.
With half of our theoretical crosstab explained,
with regards to survey respondents opinions on
the sources, the next test is to determine what
frame is most effective in an argument. My
initial hypothesis claimed that higher levels of

emotional appeal would compel the subjects
significantly more than rational appeal,
however this wasn’t the case. The frequency
table displayed a slight edge to emotional
appeal with mean of .63 for cues that leaned on
a rational frame, and a mean of .65 for cues that
leaned on an emotional frame. This slight
difference implies almost little to no difference
in how individuals processed rational versus
emotional cues. See Table 2.
These findings may speak to the preferences
of individuals that have limited information to
make a decision. This would confirm that
individuals partake in peripheral route
processing theory at higher rates, as more
significant emphasis seems to be put in the
expertise of the source providing the cue and
not as much in the framing of the cue.
The “agreeableness” multi-regression model
calculates how much explained variance exists
within the survey questions that were aimed at
determining the malleability of an individual.
The regression model was able to explain .17
(adjusted r-square) of the variance, which
leaves a lot of the unexplained variance in the
data, but it means we have part of the puzzle.
The explained variance dropped significantly,
when we switched to the regression model for
“compellingness.” I would argue this
demonstrates framing had little to no effect on
the subject’s perception of the cue. This aligns
with our evidence above, that suggested the
mean scores of emotional cues had no
significant difference from rational cues. See
Table 3.
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Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics
N

Min

Max

Mean

Std. Deviation

Agreeableness

201

0.17

1

0.5568

0.16239

Compellingness

201

0

1

0.6405

0.22439

Agreeableness Expert

201

0

1

0.5613

0.23087

Agreeableness Non-Expert

201

0

1

0.5543

0.22223

Valid N (listwise)

201

Table 2:
Statistics
Compellingness Expert
N

Compellingness Non-Expert

Valid
Missing

Mean

201

201

4

4

0.6841

0.5988

Table 3: Statistics
Compellingness Rational
N

Valid
Missing

Compellingness Emotional
201

201

4
4

Mean

0.626

0.6502

The regression models reveal there is still a
lot of unexplained variance in an individual’s
probability they will accept a cue, but both
regression models identified there were two
significant variables in the model. See Table 4,
5, 6, 7. With a negative beta weight of -.03 for
“agreeableness” and -.04 for “compellingness”,

this confirms that individuals with less political
knowledge will not only agree with political
cues, but they will find them more compelling
as well. This intuitively confirms the suspicion
that individuals who don’t have an existing
schema of political knowledge, must accept the
survey’s cues at higher levels. In addition,
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when asked to define their “usual political
preferences,” the regression model identifies a
slight leaning towards the republican party with
concerns to the “agreeableness” regression, in
addition to the “compellingness” model. I
would argue this trend is susceptible to change
if the study is repeated, especially if the cues
leaned more towards a democratic bias. Interest
in politics, age, and gender could not explain
very much variance in either model.
With multiple lines of evidence, we can
confirm that individuals are partaking in

peripheral route processing at higher levels
than central route processing. The mean scores
for the frame of the cues were not significantly
different depending on the sources tendency to
lean either on rational or emotional arguments.
However, expertise played a much more
significant role in the subject’s likelihood to
accept the cues.

Table 4: Model Summary - Agreeableness
Model

R

Adjusted R
Square

R Square

1 .438a

0.191

Std. Error of the
Estimate

0.17

0.14794

a Predictors: (Constant), Decision Making, Regardless Political Party, Knowledge, News Consumption,
Gender
Table 5: Coefficients A
Unstandardized
Coefficients

Model

B

Standardized
Coefficients
Std. Error

Sig.

Beta

(Constant)

0.498

0.037

Gender

0.035

0.024

Regardless
Political Party

0.043

Knowledge
News
Consumption
Decision Making

t

13.481

0

0.108

1.455

0.147

0.008

0.363

5.28

0

-0.025

0.01

-0.176

-2.531

0.012

-0.002

0.007

-0.017

-0.234

0.816

8.47E-05

0

0.014

0.22

0.826
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Table 6: Model Summary - Compellingness
Model

R

R Square

1 .268a

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error

0.072

0.047

0.21964

a Predictors: (Constant), Decision Making, Regardless Political Party, Knowledge, News Consumption, Gender

Table 7: Coefficients A
Unstandardized
Coefficients

Model

B

Standardized
Coefficients
Std. Error

t

Sig.

Beta

1 (Constant)

0.647

0.055

11.809

0

Gender

-0.004

0.036

-0.009

-0.116

0.908

Regardless
Political Party

0.031

0.012

0.187

2.536

0.012

Knowledge

-0.03

0.014

-0.156

-2.105

0.037

News
Consumption

-0.002

0.01

-0.015

-0.191

0.849

Decision
Making

0.001

0.001

0.106

1.503

0.134

a Dependent Variable: Compellingness

31

4. Conclusions
Many individuals displayed a tendency to
accept expert cues at higher rates in the raw
data, which allows me to confirm at least part
of my hypothesis. But given the lack of support
to suggest emotional cues are significantly
more compelling than rational cues, I am
forced to reject the whole hypothesis. Petty and
Cacioppo’s ELM theory speaks directly to the
data, and this would suggest that individuals
pay much closer attention to the source
providing the cue, rather than the content of the
cue itself. This strategy of peripheral route
processing worries me, because in a time where
there are immense collections of information
from competing experts, individuals could
potentially accept clusters of incorrect cues
from polarized political elites. Voters can exist
in their own echo chambers, where facts can be
distorted to appeal to their existing biases. Not
to mention, by significantly analyzing the cue’s
source over the message, an individual could
stop a dialogue from occurring before one can
even begins. Donald Trump may not be the
most likeable individual, and he may even
tweet the occasional false statement, however it

would be wrong to simply disregard every
word that he speaks, simply because you do not
trust him. At the very least it implies that all
individuals should at least make an effort to
expose themselves to sources who potentially
will provide them with different cues. Striving
for more political knowledge can only improve
the democratic process, as 1 more informed
voter helps bring the collective closer to
choosing the “correct” candidate for office.
Individuals that don’t possess prior knowledge
on politics need to make an attempt to
familiarize themselves with political actors,
institutions, and salient issues. Utilizing a
heuristic is a good start, and should be used to
fill small gaps in a voter’s political knowledge.
However, solely relying on cue taking
potentially leaves a voter capable of casting an
“uninformed vote,” and potentially damaging
the democratic process.

32

References
Popkin, Samuel L. 1994. The Reasoning Voter : Communication and Persuasion in Presidential
Campaigns. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Logan Dancey, and Geoffrey Sheagley. 2013. “Heuristics Behaving Badly: Party Cues and Voter
Knowledge.” American Journal of Political Science, no. 2: 312.
James H. Kuklinski, and Norman L. Hurley. 1994. “On Hearing and Interpreting Political Messages: A
Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking.” The Journal of Politics, no. 3: 729.
Althaus, Scott L. 2003. Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics : Opinion Surveys and the Will of
the People. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Nicholas A. Valentino, Vincent L. Hutchings, and Ismail K. White. 2002. “Cues That Matter: How
Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes during Campaigns.” The American Political Science Review, no. 1:
75.
Petty, Richard E., and John T. Cacioppo. 1996. Attitudes and Persuasion : Classic and Contemporary
Approaches. Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1996.
Masters, Roger D., and Denis G. Sullivan. 1990. “Nonverbal Behavior and Leadership : Emotion and
Cognition in Political Information Processing.”
Mondak, Jeffrey J. 1993. “Source Cues and Policy Approval: The Cognitive Dynamics of Public Support
for the Reagan Agenda.” American Journal of Political Science, no. 1: 186.
Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. The Rational Public : Fifty Years of Trends in
Americans’ Policy Preferences. American Politics and Political Economy Series. Chicago : University of
Chicago Press, 1992.
Sears, David O. 1988. “Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude
Change.” Public Opinion Quarterly, no. 2: 262.
Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock. Reasoning and Choice : Explorations in
Political Psychology. Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1991., 1991.
Herian, Mitchel. 2006. “Saris, Willem E., and Paul M. Sniderman, Eds.: Studies in Public Opinion:
Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change.” Perspectives on Political Science, no. 1: 62.
Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY,
USA : Cambridge University Press, 1992.
BUTUROIU, DANA RALUCA, and NICOLETA CORBU. 2015. “Moderators of Framing Effects on
Political Attitudes: Is Source Credibility Worth Investigating?” Central European Political Studies
Review / Stredoevropske Politicke Studie 17 (2): 155–77. doi:10.5817/CEPSR.2015.2.155

33

Slothuus Rune, and de Vreese Claes H. 2010. “Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Issue Framing
Effects.” The Journal of Politics, no. 3: 630.
Fowler, Anthony, and Michele Margolis. 2014. “The Political Consequences of Uninformed Voters.”
Electoral Studies34 (June): 100–110. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.09.009.
Gilens, Martin, and Naomi Murakawa. "Elite Cues and Political Decision Making." Research in
Micropolitics 6 (2002): 15-49. Accessed October 13, 2018.
Pallak, Suzanne R., Enid Murroni, and Juliann Koch. 1983. “Communicator Attractiveness and Expertise,
Emotional Versus Rational Appeals, and Persuasion: A Heuristic Versus Systematic Processing
Interpretation.” Social Cognition 2 (2): 122
Walton, Douglas N. Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority. University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
Blum-Kulka, Shoshana. Dinner Talk: Patterns of Sociability and Socialization in Family Discourse.
Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Assoc. Publishers, 1997.

34

